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Abstract: This article draws upon the civic republican tradition to offer new conceptual 
resources for the normative assessment of mental capacity law. The republican 
conception of liberty as non-domination is used to identify ways in which such laws 
generate arbitrary power that can underpin relationships of servility and insecurity. It 
also shows how non-domination provides a basis for critiquing legal tests of decision-
making that rely upon ‘diagnostic’ rather than ‘functional’ criteria. In response, two 
main civic republican strategies are recommended for securing freedom in the context 
of the legal regulation of psychological disability: self-authorisation techniques and 
participatory shaping of power. The result is a series of proposals for the reform of 
decisional capacity law, including a transition towards purely functional assessment of 
decisional capacity, surer legal footing for advanced care planning, and greater 
control over the design and administration of decision-making capacity laws by those 
with psychological disabilities. 
 
 
Should the legal capacity to decide for oneself be dependent upon mental capacity? For 
example, ought it be legally permissible to make decisions for others if their own 
decision-making abilities seem to be curtailed by dementia or depression? Supporters 
claim this ensures respect for choices people are able to make competently, while 
protecting them when poor mental health or cognitive disability impairs their decision-
  
making.1 Whereas opponents maintain that this would deprive people with mental 
disorders or cognitive disabilities of the same legal capacity enjoyed by others.2 In the 
wake of the UN Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, which requires 
“that persons with disabilities enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with others in all 
aspects of life”, these opponents have proposed dismantling or radically truncating legal 
structures that allow decisions to made for others which depart from their will or 
preferences.3 However, this invites the objection that it would expose many people with 
psychological disorders or disabilities to significantly greater self-neglect, risky 
behaviour, and exploitation by others. Thus, we find ourselves at an impasse: opponents 
of deciding on behalf of others identify problematic discrimination and paternalism, 
while its supporters object that the alternatives involve an intolerable risk of harm to 
individuals when they are at their most vulnerable. 
No easy resolution to this conflict is in sight, nor do I propose one here. My aim 
is instead to shed light on a related cluster of problems with decision-making capacity 
legislation by using resources from the civic republican tradition of political 
philosophy.4 I contrast this civic republican approach to a liberal egalitarian tendency 
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 See J Herring and J Wall ‘Autonomy, Capacity and Vulnerable Adults: Filling the Gaps in the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005’ (2015) 35 LS 698. 
2 See A Dhanda ‘Legal Capacity in the Disability Rights Convention: Stranglehold of the Past or Lodestar 
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which is ubiquitous among existing defenders and detractors of mental capacity law 
alike. In particular, civic republican conceptions of domination allow us to identify 
forms of unfreedom generated by decision-making capacity legislation that go 
undiagnosed by even vehement critics who adopt an implicitly liberal egalitarian 
approach.5 These republican resources can explain how arbitrary social power arising 
from legal regimes premised upon capacity assessment can pose a threat to an 
individual’s freedom even when it does not result in direct interference with their 
decisions. 
We shall begin by unearthing the shared philosophical foundations of the 
existing discussions of decision-making capacity law, before outlining a distinctive 
civic republican framework which provides new purchase on these debates. The 
republican conception of liberty as non-domination will then be used to identify how 
arbitrary power grounded in the legal regulation of psychological disability can give 
rise to relationships of servility and insecurity. It also provides an independent basis for 
                                                     
thesis) (Exeter: University of Exeter, 2013) ch 2; J De Wispelaere and D Casassas ‘A Life of One’s Own: 
Republican Freedom and Disability’ (2014) 29 Disability & Society p 402; T O’Shea ‘Disability and 
Domination: Lessons from Republican Political Philosophy’ (2015) Journal of Applied Philosophy doi: 
10.1111/japp.12149 p 1; T O’Shea, ‘Civic Republican Medical Ethics’ (2017) 43 Journal of Medical 
Ethics p 56; A Arstein-Kerslake and E Flynn ‘The Right to Legal Agency: Domination, Disability, and 
the Protections of Article 12 of the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities’ (2017) 13 Int 
J.L.C. p 22; T O’Shea ‘Civic Republican Disability Justice’ in A Cureton and D Wasserman (eds) Oxford 
Handbook of Philosophy and Disability (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming). For a non-
republican approach that nevertheless touches on some of the problems outlined here, see M Dunn, I 
Clare, and A Holland ‘To empower or to protect? Constructing the “vulnerable adult” in English law and 
public policy’ (2008) 28 Legal Studies p 234. 
5 No judgement is made here about the extent to which contemporary civic republicans are faithful to the 
tenets of the classical republican tradition. The term ‘republicanism’ is instead here used to “designate 
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critiquing mental capacity assessments that rely upon ‘diagnostic’ rather than purely 
‘functional’ criteria. In light of this analysis, we shall consider republican strategies for 
securing freedom in the context of decision-making capacity legislation, including 
democratic authorisation, self-authorisation, and participatory shaping of power.  This 
will culminate in a defence of a ‘popular’ rather than ‘constitutional’ approach as the 
most promising civic republican set of resources for reform of decision-making 
capacity law. The conclusion recapitulates three normative recommendations emerging 
from this republican analysis: functional assessment of decisional capacity, increased 
advanced care planning, and greater participatory control over the construction and 
implementation of mental capacity law. 
 
I – Liberal Egalitarian Approaches to Decisional Capacity 
 
The fiercest critics of decision-making capacity legislation believe that “mental 
capacity can no longer serve as a proxy for legal capacity.”6 This legal capacity has 
been characterised as “a construct which enables law to recognise and validate the 
decisions and transactions that a person makes.”7 It thereby underpins the juridical 
accreditation of decisions such as those concerning medical treatment, research 
participation, financial transactions, and residence, insofar as acknowledging the legal 
validity of a decision implicitly depends on recognising the decision-maker as someone 
with the legal personality and authority to so decide. For a large range of decisions in 
the relevant jurisdictions, the legal capacity to decide currently requires possessing 
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sufficient psychological abilities.8 For instance, English law regarding adults, which 
shall be our main focus throughout, outlines conditions that permit deciding on 
another’s behalf in their best interests on matters like whether they should undergo a 
medical procedure for a physical condition, continue to live with their family, or give a 
financial gift to a relative. Someone is deemed to lack capacity to decide for themselves 
when, due to an impairment or disturbance of their mind or brain, they are unable to 
communicate such a decision, or to understand, retain, or ‘use or weigh’ relevant 
information. 9 It is measures of this kind which critics oppose when they deny that “the 
right to legal capacity is dependent upon, or equitable with, requisite mental/functional 
capacity.”10 Let us call legal orders which institute or retain such requirements 
‘decisional regimes’. 
The sundering of legal and mental capacity would have momentous 
consequences. Yet, this recommendation emerges from a surprisingly familiar liberal 
egalitarian framework. While liberal egalitarianism is a broad philosophical and 
political tendency rather than a single easily demarcated position, it is possible to 
present a stylised account of common assumptions made by its proponents.11 The 
liberal egalitarian seeks to protect and promote individual freedom in the context of 
equal respect for each person. The primary liberal conception of freedom has been 
negative liberty: the absence of interference from others. Liberals also now commonly 
                                                     
8 More precisely, we might say that the possible use of legal capacity presupposes mental capacity in 
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For discussion, see P Bieby ‘The Conflation of Competence and Capacity in English Medical Law: A 
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9 Mental Capacity Act 2005, s 3(1).  
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champion personal autonomy in addition to negative liberty, aiming to cultivate the 
abilities and opportunities necessary for individuals to govern their own lives. It was 
once common to characterise autonomy in hierarchical terms: where, for example, 
someone is autonomous with respect to those first-order desires which they have a 
higher-order desire to be motivated by, such that they want to want to act on them.12 
Discussions of disability have more often foregrounded relational conceptions of 
autonomy, however, with less emphasis on the precise intra-psychological structures 
needed for self-government, and greater focus on the idea that self-government is not 
only compatible with benign relations of social dependence but often requires such 
social infrastructure.13 Supporters and opponents alike of decisional regimes typically 
accept these broadly liberal egalitarian commitments to the value of negative liberty, 
autonomy, and equal respect for persons.  
We can distinguish opponents of decisional regimes in terms of their more 
uncompromising position on what equal respect for persons implies for how 
commitments to negative liberty and relational autonomy are understood. In particular, 
they believe that decisional regimes are too paternalistic towards those deemed to have 
                                                     
12 This was originally proposed as an account of free will in H Frankfurt ‘Freedom of the Will and the 
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a disorder or disability, by striking a mistaken balance between respecting their freedom 
and protecting their welfare.14 As Gerard Quinn has claimed in this context: “Equality 
of respect means extending to persons with disabilities the same expansive latitude 
allowed to others to shape their own lives and make their own mistakes.”15 When this 
latitude is different for people with and without disabilities, then these critics believe 
that the latter will, unjustifiably, not enjoy legal capacity on an equal basis with the 
former. 
Decisional regimes are therefore accused of being inegalitarian for imposing 
excessively onerous and rationalistic criteria for permitting people to make decisions 
for themselves.16 This is thought to restrict the freedom of people with psychological 
disorders or disabilities in an unequal fashion, since requiring significant abilities to 
understand, recall, reason, and communicate will often mean preventing them from 
exercising legal capacity to the same extent as other people. Thus, these radical critics 
deny that, within an egalitarian framework, the extent of an individual’s functional 
capacities to decide should determine whether they possess legal capacity. For example, 
Bach and Kerzner propose that we reject tests of individual functional capacities to 
“understand information and appreciate the nature and consequences of a decision”.17 
In the absence of these functional abilities, does any recognisable will or preference 
remain to be honoured? Bach and Kerzner take a significantly less demanding standard 
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Submission on Legal Capacity to the Oireachtas Committee on Justice, Defence & Equality (Galway: 
NUI Galway, 2011) pp 90-91; see also Bach and Kerzner, above n 6 p 167. Discussion of further 
objections can be found in E Flynn and A Arstein-Kerslake ‘Legislating Personhood: Realising the Right 
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15 Quinn, above n 14, p 93. 
16 Bach and Kerzner, above n 6, p 60. 
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to suffice: best interest decisions are only to be countenanced when a “minimum 
threshold of human agency” goes unmet.18 
Advocates of such alternatives to decisional regimes can make a plausible case 
to be pursuing liberal egalitarian desiderata of negative liberty and relational autonomy. 
Negative liberty in the context of disability has been characterised by Bach and Kerzner 
as “the absence of coercion, regulation and intervention by the state and other 
entities”.19 The recognition of legal capacity wherever a will or intention is discernable 
seems to protect this liberty because it acts as a juridical shield against attempts to non-
consensually override or intervene in people’s decision-making. Opponents of 
decisional regimes also understand legal capacity more positively as a tool used to 
“express our selfhood […] in the lifeworld – in the myriad of tiny daily transactions 
that make up who we are.”20 The strong presumption of legal capacity is intended to 
shift our focus away from deciding for others and towards providing the social support 
needed to create the conditions in which each individual can develop, scrutinise, 
communicate, and enact their will or intention. Thus, in championing social 
relationships which promote effective self-expression, the radical liberal egalitarian not 
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only aims to reduce interference from others but also seeks a positive relational 
autonomy.21  
Supporters of decisional regimes need not deny that negative liberty and 
relational autonomy are important goals. For example, they can claim that while the 
negative liberty of those with psychological disorders or disabilities is genuinely 
valuable, it is sometimes outweighed by welfare considerations. These supporters 
might also maintain that relational autonomy is similarly valuable but sometimes 
unachievable even with assistance from others if someone’s psychological capacities 
are sufficiently inhibited by disorder or disability. In fact, there is evidence that each of 
these attitudes do animate decision-making capacity legislation. Consider the Mental 
Capacity Act 2005 in English law. While it can permit interference with negative liberty 
for the purposes of welfare, it still acknowledges the value of this liberty by requiring 
regard to be had to whether best interest decisions can be implemented in ways “less 
restrictive” of “freedom of action”.22 Furthermore, it also requires that an individual “is 
not to be treated as unable to make a decision unless all practicable steps to help him to 
do so have been taken without success”, thereby recognising both the possibility of 
relational autonomy and its potential limits.23 Therefore, there are reasons to attribute 
liberal egalitarian conceptions of freedom to many opponents and supporters of 
decisional regimes alike, despite their disagreement as to whether a commitment to 
equal respect makes it appropriate to pursue both negative liberty and relational 
autonomy to the same extent irrespective of the effects of disorder or disability. 
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II – Liberty as Non-Domination 
 
We have seen how liberal egalitarianism provides a conceptual and normative 
framework for understanding both sides of the current debate about decisional regimes. 
Indeed, it is sufficiently commonplace to have needed explicit philosophical excavation 
to render it visible. Yet, liberal egalitarianism is not the only way to approach the 
relationship between decision-making and legal capacity. I shall argue that hitherto 
unexploited resources from the civic republican tradition enable us to tighten our grip 
on problems produced by decisional regimes and point towards potential solutions to 
those problems.  
We can begin with prominent republican conceptions of freedom, which 
identify liberty with non-domination. For someone to be dominated is for them to be 
“dependent on a social relationship in which some other person or group wields 
arbitrary power over them.”24 Two features of civic republican accounts of domination 
are especially noteworthy. The first is their modal articulation: liberty can be 
diminished by the capacity to exercise power and not simply when that power is 
actually exercised. The second feature is that domination arises only from arbitrary 
power. This arbitrariness is sometimes understood minimally as the absence of reliable 
constraints on power by rules and procedures which are common knowledge.25 For our 
purposes, however, arbitrariness is understood more substantively. Social power is 
arbitrary insofar as it can be exercised over someone on an unequal basis through 
another agent’s uncontrolled or unaccountable will. We see both modal and 
arbitrariness dimensions in Cicero’s discussion of slavery: “the most miserable feature 
of this condition is that, even if the master happens not to be oppressive, he can be so 
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should he wish.”26 The master dominates because his power over the slave is controlled 
by nothing other than his own choice (or arbitrium). 
Civic republicans often construe the power involved in domination in terms of 
the capacity to interfere on an arbitrary basis with the decisions of another.27 This 
throws the contrast between non-domination and negative liberty into sharper relief. 
Domination is compatible with the presence of negative liberty because someone can 
be vulnerable to arbitrary interference even in the absence of actual interference (e.g. 
slaves whose masters happen not to interfere). Conversely, someone can have their 
negative liberty infringed without being dominated, because the interference with them 
can avoid arbitrariness (e.g. citizens whose states impose fair and democratically 
controlled taxation). Liberty as non-domination is therefore distinct from negative 
liberty.28 
Why is domination without actual interference problematic? The first reason is 
that those who are at the mercy of others suffer an affront to their social status: they are 
subordinated to others irrespective of whether this leaves them materially harmed. In 
addition, domination can foster two politically salient psychological harms: the fearful 
uncertainty which arises from not being assured that one will avoid interference, and 
the servility that can develop in an effort to actually forestall it. Recall Cicero’s example 
of the non-oppressive master. While he does not directly interfere with the slave’s 
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choices, she faces pressure to ingratiate herself with him nonetheless, since her actions 
are conditional upon him not changing his mind.  
 
III – Sources of Domination in Decisional Regimes 
 
Do decisional regimes generate domination? An initial cluster of concerns surrounds 
the latitude granted to decisional capacity assessors and those deciding on behalf of 
others. This is manifested in their leeway with respect to whether to exercise their 
powers to assess or decide for others, the interpretation of rules determining who lacks 
decisional capacity and how to decide on their behalf, and the translation of these rules 
into judgements about particular individuals. Each creates an opening for alien control 
– even in the absence of actual interference.  
Civic republicans aim to ensure that “non-interference you enjoy at the hands 
of others is not enjoyed by their grace and you do not live at their mercy”.29 This 
security against arbitrary interference can be eroded when decisional regimes grant 
powers rather than impose duties to assess decisional capacity and to decide on behalf 
of incapacitous others. Granting powers allows a choice to be made as to whether 
authority that could be exercised will be exercised. This is not a de facto power to flout 
the law but rather an ability that the law permits a range of people to use without 
obliging them to do so. Admittedly, the discretion enabled is not entirely arbitrary, since 
it is democratically delegated, often accompanied by forms of professional oversight, 
and limited to initiating assessment and decision-making procedures that are 
themselves legally circumscribed. Significant control can nevertheless rest with those 
whose forbearance averts a process that may impose decisions upon someone else.  
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Consider a social worker who chooses not to pursue nascent doubts about an 
elderly woman’s capacity to decide where to live. Since the woman is beholden to the 
inclinations of another, then her freedom is diminished irrespective of any actual 
interference. If she actively fears being compelled to move to a care home, then her 
unfreedom can also create the kinds of insecurity and pliancy that republicans identify: 
she cannot be confident about what will happen to her, and she has incentives to keep 
in the social worker’s good graces. Note the somewhat perverse effect whereby, in such 
cases, greater dependence on the will of the powerful is generated when the unwanted 
intervention is merely possible than when it will necessarily take place. 
In addition to discretion over whether to initiate the assessment process, another 
potential source of arbitrary power is the indeterminacy of decisional legislation. Both 
legislation and case law do attempt to provide clear criteria for analysing concepts like 
decision-making capacity. For example, we have seen that English law analyses 
someone’s inability to make a decision into an inability “(a) to understand the 
information relevant to the decision, (b) to retain that information, (c) to use or weigh 
that information as part of the process of making the decision, or (d) to communicate 
his decision.” 30 However, the meaning and implications of these criteria remain highly 
contested. To take one recently debated example: when, if at all, does an anorexic with 
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high-functioning cognitive abilities become unable to use or weigh relevant 
information in decisions about their caloric consumption? Do they lack this ability only 
once the formal validity of their reasoning about relevant information is impaired, or 
can being motivated by consistent but seemingly pathological values be sufficient to 
render them unable to use or weigh this information? Judgements on such matters 
continue to be deeply divided among psychiatrists and lawyers, as well as the non-
specialist healthcare workers who must also interpret and apply the law.31 
The main problem with this openness of decisional law from a republican 
perspective is that it can increase arbitrariness and decrease transparency in how power 
is capable of being exercised. Significant plasticity in the interpretation of fundamental 
concepts in decisional legislation provides greater leeway to those assessing or deciding 
for others to frame the law in ways most congenial to their favoured result. This then 
functions to increase the extent to which non-interference is enjoyed without 
confidence and by the grace of another. 
Of course, the courts adjudicate in many situations where the law is unclear, 
and in doing so they develop the otherwise relatively thin conceptions of decisional 
capacity and best interests to be found in legislation and attendant codes of practice. 
Yet, considerable legal indeterminacy remains.32 Only a tiny fraction of the actions 
performed under the authority of decisional legislation can ever be directly scrutinised 
                                                     
31 J Tan, A Stewart, R Fitzpatrick and T Hope ‘Competence to Make Treatment Decisions in Anorexia 
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32 On the wider problem of legal indeterminacy, see T Endicott Vagueness in Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2000). 
  
in court, and scholars have observed how courts themselves “will take a flexible 
approach to the legal definition [of mental capacity] to enable them to reach their 
preferred outcome.”33 Furthermore, the more determinate understanding of decision-
making capacity and best interests which crystallises out of the judicial process under 
common law still allows considerable latitude in how the limits of power are construed. 
Again, significant room for manoeuvre in how power over someone might be exercised 
– here stemming from the indeterminacy of decisional law – can contribute to 
domination even when those with such power are inclined to protect negative liberty. 
If I can gloss the rules to make it more or less difficult for you to avoid interference, 
then our relationship is marked by an important imbalance in power and social status, 
whether or not I actually do so. 
The final related concern is that particular applications of decisional capacity 
law can be underdetermined in practice even when its requirements are relatively clear 
in the abstract. Consider the commonplace principle that interventions made on behalf 
of people without decisional capacity must be made for their ‘benefit’ or in their ‘best 
interests’. The law may provide clear general guidance about these interests, such as 
that subjective happiness is to be privileged over health outcomes or reduction of risk. 
But translating this guidance into a determination of a particular person’s interests is a 
process which is difficult to codify, because it relies upon highly contextual judgements 
about the salient features of their life. For example, not only are the interests of a 
gregarious teenage girl with schizophrenia likely to differ from that of an ambitious but 
temperamental middle-aged man with pronounced autism, but simply determining what 
                                                     
33 G Richardson ‘Mental Capacity in the Shadow of Suicide: What Can the Law Do?’ (2013) 9 Int. J.L.C. 
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these interests are in any specific case will involve fine-grained ethical and 
psychological judgements that others may not share. 
Likewise, we know that assessors working with the same broad understanding 
of decisional capacity sometimes disagree among themselves in borderline cases as to 
whether someone is competent to make certain choices they face. The fine 
discriminations involved in much capacity assessment and best interest decision-
making creates extra ‘wiggle room’ with respect to the powers granted by decisional 
regimes. This adds an additional dimension of flexibility – further untrammelling the 
power to interfere and increasing its opacity – again potentially contributing to 
domination irrespective of whether it leads to increased interference. 
We have encountered reasons to think that decisional regimes diminish freedom 
in ways not immediately identifiable by the negative conceptions of liberty that are 
adopted by their existing supporters and opponents. This is because the powers they 
establish to interfere with whole areas of decision-making are manipulable by those 
who choose whether to assess or impose decisions, how to construe general legal 
procedures for assessing and deciding, and how to apply these general procedures to 
particular individuals. As a cumulative effect, individuals authorised to assess and 
decide for others often possess a non-negligible degree of alien control over people 
deemed to be psychologically impaired. The very possibility of increased interference 
through these channels can be sufficient to generate insecurity and servility when 
nothing but the dispositions of capacity assessors and best interest decision-makers 
forestalls intervention. 
Liberal egalitarian supporters of decisional regimes are likely to demur at the 
idea that scope for discretion in the triggering, interpretation, and application of 
decision-making capacity legislation constitutes a major problem. Other laws that can 
  
result in interference also depend upon judgements which resist exhaustive codification 
– consider public interest tests for initiating criminal prosecution – where such 
flexibility helps avert perverse outcomes arising from a mechanical legalism. 
Furthermore, it may seem obtuse to be concerned about the manipulability of decisional 
legislation, given the assumption that most people in caring roles and professions are 
motivated much more by beneficence than any desire to use legal ambiguities to impose 
their own wills. 
However, the prevalence and potential desirability of de jure or de facto legal 
discretion should not blind us to its attendant costs, which still need to be recognised, 
mitigated wherever possible, and carefully weighed against alternatives. Nor is it a 
decisive objection that significant discretionary power to interfere is present elsewhere 
in the legal process, since these other instances are also ripe for republican revaluation. 
Moreover, the insecurity and servility which domination can engender is so insidious 
precisely because it is compatible with malice, indifference, and goodwill alike. In 
order to identify domination, we do not have to presuppose unkindly or callous holders 
of power. As Cicero demonstrates, the harms of domination are not contingent upon an 
express will to dominate: vulnerability to the dispositions of the presently non-
oppressive is vulnerability all the same. The seventeenth century English republican 
Algernon Sidney was to underscore this idea when he remarked: “he is a slave who 
serves the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst”.34 
 
IV – Diagnostic Criteria 
 
 
                                                     
34 A Sydney Discourses Concerning Government (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1990) p 441. 
  
Domination can arise in decisional regimes not only from the problem of legal 
discretion but also from the form taken by decisional capacity assessment. Hybrid 
models – combining functional tests and diagnostic criteria – are one problematic kind 
of capacity assessment from a republican perspective. Functional tests seek to 
determine which decision-making tasks someone is currently able to perform. For 
example, can they understand enough relevant information about the nature and risks 
of a specific surgical procedure to be able to decide whether to consent? Diagnostic 
criteria seek to determine whether the failure to meet the requirements of a functional 
test are due to a psychological disturbance or impairment – such as delirium, 
intoxication, mental disorder, or intellectual disability. English law incorporates a 
diagnostic criterion insofar as decisional incapacity is only recognised when it occurs 
“because of an impairment of, or a disturbance in the functioning of, the mind or 
brain.”35 While one might think that, by its very nature, decisional incapacity implies a 
disturbance or impairment, this condition is understood more robustly, such that a 
substantive diagnosable psychological problem is necessary, where cases like an 
inability to use relevant information simply because one happens to be angry or 
distracted do not count. In terminology resonant for civic republicans, it has been 
described as an assessment of a person’s “status”.36 
Liberal egalitarian opponents of decisional regimes will object to measures that 
rely upon a diagnosis of cognitive or psychosocial disability in apportioning legal 
status.37 This is because the negative liberty of individuals with disabilities will be 
decreased disproportionately to others, and so there will be a failure to meet the 
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stringent conception of equal respect for persons adopted by these opponents. In 
contrast, the civic republican ideal of liberty as non-domination allows us to offer a 
deeper account of the problems posed by diagnostic criteria in determinations of legal 
capacity.  
We have seen that republicans take liberty to be compromised by the arbitrary 
power to interfere rather than by actual interference alone. Their primary goal will not 
be to ensure that people with psychological disabilities encounter no more interference 
than other people – since, in the right circumstances, interference can help protect 
people’s interests without being a fundamental affront to their freedom. For 
republicans, the problem with a diagnostic criterion will be that it subjects people with 
psychological disabilities to a power of interference on an unequal basis. Different 
constraints on the power of the state, and those the state empowers to interfere, will 
apply to people with psychological disabilities even when the extent of their decision-
making abilities is the same or greater than those without a disability. This can 
contribute to relationships of personal and institutional domination even in the absence 
of actual interference. Consider the chilling effect upon the behaviour of someone who 
knows their authority to decide can be called into question in ways that the abilities of 
people without a disability cannot be. This unequal standard creates the conditions for 
a cautious and deferential attitude towards carers, healthcare staff, and social workers, 
who they must take extra care not to alienate in ways that other people with the same 
level of decision-making function do not. 
Republicanism is also able to capture the sense in which a diagnostic criterion 
imperils the freedom which arises from an equal recognition of legal and social status 
(and not simply equal opportunities to act free from interference). Analytically distinct 
from any actual interference or increased vulnerability to interference for those who 
  
meet the diagnostic criterion, it creates a differential social status between those capable 
of being deemed unfit to decide for themselves and everyone else. The traditional 
concerns here would be with stigmatisation and ‘othering’ of those with mental health 
problems or cognitive disabilities. However, civic republicanism allows us to identify 
an additional recognitive harm which threatens people’s freedom even more directly. 
This is because it accommodates the intuition that to find oneself symbolically relegated 
to a subaltern position can be an affront to one’s liberty. In this respect, some civic 
republicans appeal to a distinctive conception of the liber homo, whose freedom 
depends upon social recognition: 
I am free when I am recognized by others as enjoying a status that resiliently 
protects me against arbitrary interference and guarantees my equal status as a 
citizen living in community with others.38 
Diagnostic criteria threaten recognition of equal social and legal status because of how 
they mark some people as different – subject to different rules and accorded different 
rights – not directly based on what they can do but on who or what they are deemed to 
be. Orthogonal to whether it actually impedes their decision-making, this introduces a 
symbolic form of subordination that action-centric negative liberty accounts are poorly 
placed to identify. Both the problems of discriminatory vulnerability and recognitive 
subordination support a transition to an entirely functional approach to decisional 
capacity assessment. 
This civic republican account of diagnostic criteria also provides conceptual 
resources to make sense of the recommendations of the UN High Commissioner on 
Human Rights regarding the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities. We 
find the Commissioner denying that “persons with disabilities cannot be lawfully 
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subject to detention for care and treatment or to preventive detention”, while 
maintaining that “the legal grounds upon which restriction of liberty is determined must 
be de-linked from the disability and neutrally defined so as to apply to all persons on 
an equal basis.”39 This strategy has the advantage of resisting the reification of disability 
into a distinct socio-legal status that attaches to a person on a continuous basis. Equality 
of status is conserved without this meaning that a difficulty in decision-making 
associated with an impairment can never restrict the use of legal capacity. The Roman 
influence on civic republican thought has made this political tradition particularly 
sensitive to status differentials that find expression in the law, and the egalitarian 
commitments of its more recent proponents militate against such legal codification of 
status even on an implicit basis. ‘De-linking’ promises to avoid these prohibitions so 
long as the law does not simply revert to a status or hybrid model when it is applied and 
enforced.40 In either case, republican attention to unequal status rather than merely 
different outcomes provides tools to understand the problems raised by reliance on 
diagnostic criteria. 
 
V – Two Objections to Domination by Decisional Regimes 
 
Domination arising from legal discretion and compounded by diagnostic or hybrid 
capacity assessment may seem like grist to the mill of opponents of decisional regimes. 
However, these difficulties are not yet conclusive reasons to abandon decision-making 
capacity legislation, especially as various mitigation strategies are available. Can 
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decisional regimes sufficiently avoid domination to remain justifiable public policies? 
We shall examine a number of ways in which these potential problems might be 
accommodated, focusing on the subjects of domination, and the democratic 
authorisation, self-authorisation, and participatory shaping of power. 
An initial defence of decisional regimes focuses not on mitigation but rather on 
demonstrating that domination is not a live possibility for people with impaired 
decision-making. Indeed, it can seem downright paradoxical to object to powers to 
interfere with the decisions of people who are unable to make decisions. This might 
help to explain why leading contemporary civic republican theorists explicitly restrict 
their analyses of political freedom to citizens who are “able-minded”.41 However, such 
restrictions are misguided, and the subjects of decisional legislation are almost always 
at least potential subjects of domination. To this end, it is important to distinguish an 
ability to decide simpliciter from an ability to decide for oneself, competently, or 
authentically. For example, in Re E, a woman with anorexia nervosa, E, was found to 
be both intelligent and articulate, yet, in virtue of her anorexia, lacking in mental 
capacity to make treatment decisions about tube feeding.42 While in a basic sense E 
could and did decide – she had formed a clear and settled intention to refuse tube 
feeding – in a more demanding sense, whereby genuine decisions depend upon 
sufficient functional abilities to use or weigh relevant information, the court determined 
that she could not decide. This distinction defuses the paradox because domination 
arises from arbitrary power to interfere with decisions in the minimal sense, whereas 
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 For example, see P Pettit ‘Freedom: Psychological, Ethical, and Political’ (2015) 18 Critical Review 
of International Social and Political Philosophy p 386 and P Pettit On the People’s Terms (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012) pp 75, 78, 87, 94, 130 and 138. 
42 Re E (Medical Treatment Anorexia) [2012] EWHC 1639 (COP). 
  
decisional legislation concerns the ability to make decisions in a more expansive and 
demanding sense. 
In rare situations, such as comatose patients who have given no indication of 
their will, or for some affected by very pronounced cognitive disabilities, then it may 
no longer make sense to identify any relevant decisions or capacities for making them 
that could be dominated even in the minimal sense. However, these outliers do not 
prevent the vast majority of those with psychological disabilities being potential 
subjects of domination. But perhaps the fundamental thought goes further here: that it 
is simply unimportant to ensure decisions made without sufficient competence are 
undominated. If so, this is a normative rather than conceptual claim about domination, 
which ought to be kept analytically distinct from the latter. In other words, it would not 
affirm that domination of people lacking robust decision-making capacities was 
impossible, but only that such domination is comparatively unimportant when 
contrasted with the domination of people with these capacities. But this inegalitarian 
claim would stand in need of further argumentative support – especially to establish the 
stronger conclusion necessary to render republican liberty irrelevant, namely that 
domination of those without decision-making competence should be given no weight 
rather than relatively less weight. 
Another objection holds that the democratic authorisation of power under 
decisional regimes renders it non-arbitrary, and therefore non-dominating, irrespective 
of the kind of control it places in the hands of others. Laws that one gives to oneself are 
not expressions of alien control, and as equal members of a democratic citizenry which 
has legislated a decisional regime for itself, then those subject to such laws would not 
be dominated by them. So understood, no arbitrariness arises from foreseeable features 
of administrating the power to interfere – including hybrid regimes and the three 
  
dimensions of legal discretion identified here – since no arbitrariness is present in the 
institution of this system. 
The democratic rejoinder to concerns about domination arising from decisional 
capacity law can be challenged on several fronts. For people with psychological 
impairments, there is not formal democratic equality in many jurisdictions – for 
instance, people deemed to have diminished mental capacity around voting are denied 
proxy votes on this basis.43 Additionally, the formal right to vote alone does not secure 
the material capabilities necessary to meaningfully exercise voting rights or participate 
in the wider democratic process of public debate and scrutiny of policy. Nor does the 
mere presence of these capabilities ensure sufficient control by people with 
psychological disabilities over powers to interfere with their decision-making. The 
problem of majoritarianism means that someone can possess an equal electoral and 
public voice without the guarantee of equal respect for their interests and worldview. 
Thus, what currently passes for democratic endorsement does not itself rule out the 
possibility of domination. On the contrary, the difficulties in securing genuinely 
inclusive democratic grounds for decision-making capacity legislation suggests that all 
the powers to interfere which it licenses will be somewhat arbitrary when its institution 
is not sufficiently controlled by those subject to it. 
Let us suppose that remedies can be found for a lack of formal voting rights, 
capabilities for participation in public discourse, and majoritarian neglect for the 
interests and worldview of people with psychological disabilities. While this would be 
a welcome contribution to reducing domination, it is only a partial solution which does 
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not resolve the problems of legal discretion and of hybrid assessment regimes. Classical 
republican vocabulary distinguishes domination arising from dominium and from 
imperium: the former concerns the power of citizens over other citizens, and the latter 
concerns the power of the state over citizens. While broad and inclusive democratising 
measures will help to combat imperium – the ways in which state power can confront 
citizens as a form of alien control – it does not fundamentally challenge dominium. 
Relationships between citizens which are marked by important elements of personal 
mastery and arbitrary power of some over others can obtain despite a macro-political 
context in which laws bolstering this power receive fulsome democratic support from 
citizens. Thus, it is too hasty to think that eliminating arbitrariness from the institution 
of decisional regimes will thereby eliminate domination arising from arbitrary power 
fostered in the administration of such regimes. We need to attend to the micro-political 
relationships between people with psychological disabilities and their families, friends, 
carers, and the health and social care workers with power over them, rather than 
pursuing a macro-political strategy of democratisation and inclusion alone. 
 
VI – Advanced Care Planning and Republican Freedom 
 
If democratic authorisation of power is not sufficient to combat domination in a way 
that recognises and remedies the problems of decisional regimes, then what other 
responses can republicans offer? Two complementary approaches that would seek to 
reduce the arbitrariness of power by increasing meaningful control over it are evaluated 
here. The first is the use of advanced care planning which is shaped by the care recipient 
– including, in extreme cases, the self-authorization of the use of coercive force. The 
second is participatory influence over implementing, scrutinising, and determining the 
necessary conditions for proxy decision-making. 
  
Advanced directives are a familiar, much-vaunted, but relatively underused 
tool, which allow people to provide instructions for what decisions should be made 
when they can no longer decide for themselves.44 This can involve a Ulysses structure 
in which someone engages in a form of social self-binding: soliciting resistance or 
constraint in advance when they believe that they may begin to act against what they 
take to be their long-term interests. A similar framework is found in advance care 
planning – involving pre-agreed policies and crisis cards that record what should be 
done when someone’s decision-making may deteriorate.45 For example, for someone 
who anticipates a manic episode, this might involve them distinguishing conditions 
under which they should be left alone from conditions under which they should be made 
to do something they would no longer want to do (such as take their heart disease 
medication despite feeling invincible). Given the limited uptake and scope of advanced 
directives, then advance care planning could focus much more on decisional issues – 
both when to assess capacity, how decisional tests should be applied, whether there are 
individualised signs that someone is lacking or retaining capacity, in addition to what 
they believe should be done in each case. This would have both a clarifying role that 
reduces ambiguity and an authorising role that increases control over power. 
Liberal egalitarians of both stripes can also endorse such measures as a means 
to increase people’s freedom; however, it can be difficult for them to provide a 
satisfactory account of how this happens. From the perspective of negative liberty, there 
are two ways to classify such measures. We could say that interference takes place but 
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that it is nevertheless justified by pre-authorisation. The problem with this analysis is 
that it entails that the person facing interference is being made less rather than more 
free – however warranted this unfreedom might be. Alternatively, we might claim that 
pre-authorisation ensures that any interventions do not count as genuine interference, 
and thereby do not infringe negative liberty. However, simply denying that there is any 
interference can be hard to maintain when someone is confronted with coercive force 
that they are currently vehemently rejecting. Thus, within the framework of negative 
liberty, it is hard to capture the idea that social self-binding can involve genuine 
interference with someone whilst still preserving or increasing their freedom. 
The idea that advanced care planning can increase our freedom is more 
consonant with a relational autonomy approach which claims that active social supports 
can help secure individual freedom – perhaps even when such support takes the form 
of self-authorised friction or coercion. However, the appeals which liberal egalitarian 
opponents of decisional regimes make to relational autonomy are significantly 
underdetermined: it is suggested that social interventions can enable rather than thwart 
individual liberty, but a robust theoretical explanation of why these structures are 
freedom-promoting or freedom-preserving in a disability context is lacking.46 
Republican conceptions of freedom allow us to make this kind of relational autonomy 
intelligible. 
Advanced care planning will be compatible with the ideal of non-domination 
when any potential interference it involves is not arbitrary. Happily, interference 
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emerging from such planning has an excellent claim to be non-arbitrary because the 
power to interfere – say, ensuring someone takes their medication when they no longer 
want to – will be controlled in ways that give due respect to a person’s judgements 
about their own interests. It is former rather than current judgements which are deferred 
to, which raises the question of whether a care plan agreed upon at one time can remain 
binding in perpetuity. Indeed, even presupposing a continuity of personal identity may 
be controversial here when the former and latter selves exhibit important psychological 
differences. Nevertheless, these metaphysical scruples aside, there is a strong intuitive 
case that when the social power to interfere is constrained by a plan authorised and 
shaped by a person who is seemingly the same as the one over whom the power is held, 
then such power will be amply non-arbitrary.47 Therefore, it will not contravene the 
republican requirement for liberty as non-domination, even when genuine interference 
is exercised over someone in the execution of the plan. 
Of course, advanced care planning is not always possible or appropriate. 
Someone may not have had an opportunity to agree a plan before a crisis situation arises 
– for example, if they are experiencing an unanticipated medication-induced psychosis. 
Similarly, situations may arise which an existing plan does not cover – such as whether 
to compulsorily treat a new medical condition that emerges during a period in which 
someone is already experiencing protracted problems making decisions. What then 
might be done to promote non-domination other than advanced care planning? 
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VII – Participatory Strategies 
 
Liberal egalitarian opponents of decisional regimes have sometimes recognised that 
when there is no-one who can interpret someone’s intentions or will then decisions 
concerning that person might need to be ‘facilitated’ by others.48 Yet, even this 
facilitation would not seek an ‘objective’ best interest decision, instead being 
constrained by an “understanding of the person’s prior wishes, instructions and values”, 
with respect to what would benefit them and improve the quality of their life.49 Other 
than the kind of self-binding directives which also feature in advanced care planning, 
no other kinds of deciding for others are treated as warranted.  
In light of these restrictions on deciding for others, this latitudinarian approach 
to legal personality must confront some difficult cases – particularly those in which 
someone acts in ways that are both seemingly under the influence of an impairment and 
likely to be very detrimental to their long-term wellbeing. The response of some critics 
of mental capacity legislation has been to emphasise the importance of the ‘dignity of 
risk’, as well as to claim that in an “emergency situation”, in which “supporting the 
person’s wishes would constitute civil or criminal negligence”, then a supporter is 
permitted to act against these wishes.50 However, civil or criminal negligence is a high 
bar, ruling in a great deal of self-harming behaviour, which the support paradigm not 
only requires others to tolerate but to actively assist in undertaking.  
This should give us pause for thought. Can we retain decisional regimes that 
would lessen these problems, while simultaneously reducing domination, and doing 
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justice to the value of self-determination that animates liberal egalitarian critics of such 
regimes? I shall outline a participatory republicanism which, in broad outline, indicates 
how this might be achieved. 
In Hannah Arendt’s influential account of statelessness – in a line resonant for 
our own discussion of legal capacity – she tells us that “[t]he first essential step on the 
road to total domination is to kill the juridical person in man.”51 She is concerned with 
the “right to have rights”, where some commentators understand this to mean little more 
than a right to an effective state which will enforce an individual’s other rights.52 
However, this ignores the deeper republican strain in Arendt’s political thought, which 
insists on the agency of a politically active citizenry that secures its own rights: “We 
are not born equal; we become equal as members of a group on the strength of our 
decision to guarantee ourselves mutually equal rights.”53 In developing the idea of the 
right to have rights, Étienne Balibar concludes “no one can be liberated or emancipated 
by others, from ‘above,’ even were this ‘above’ to be right itself, or the democratic 
state”.54 Whether we endorse the strong claim that emancipation must always be self-
emancipation, the republican ideal of citizens participating in collective action to free 
themselves from domination is an attractive one, and it is likely to appeal to many who 
believe that current decisional regimes are not sensitive enough to the agency of those 
whose lives they shape. 
To that end: how might a decisional regime move towards a republican form of 
participatory self-rule? It could start with the proposals mooted above to allow 
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individuals more input into shaping both how decisional assessment criteria are applied 
and how best interest decisions are made in their case. In addition, even when a finding 
of incapacity is made and an objective test of best interests is employed – which asks 
neither simply what the person wants or would have wanted were their decision-making 
capacities less diminished – then the individual can be given greater procedural control. 
For example, this might include powers to stipulate that certain people be excluded 
from the process, either as primary decision-makers or people whose views are solicited 
as evidence – such as a parent or care worker who the individual does not feel 
understands their needs. 
At a macro-political level, people with cognitive disabilities and mental health 
problems could have a greater role in determining what the general conditions of 
decisional capacity are and how they should be applied in the context of certain 
impairments. This could entail greater contributions from advocacy groups in the 
drafting of legislation and codes of practice, in order to do more to reflect the 
experiences of those with psychological impairments, rather than predominantly 
psychiatric, psychological, and legal experts. For example, in determining if legal tests 
for decision-making capacity should be predominantly cognitive, or whether they ought 
to give more weight to emotional, evaluative, or motivational abilities, then those 
deemed to struggle to decide for themselves need to be given a greater role in informing 
the design and oversight of such tests, insofar as they are experts-by-experience in such 
matters and will be at the sharp end of inaccurate assessments. 
While there is some input from affected groups through the ordinary democratic 
process of voting in elections, we saw how this is indirect and is diminished further by 
practical obstacles to political participation that can be encountered disproportionately 
by those with psychological impairments. Thus, providing greater scope for those most 
  
affected by decisional capacity laws to scrutinise and help shape the construction of the 
relevant assessments and procedures for best interest decision-making would 
strengthen the degree to which the rules which govern people with psychological 
impairments are meaningfully fashioned by them. 
 
VIII – Against Constitutional Republicanism 
 
We have encountered various republican remedies to the problems of domination that 
arise in the context of decisional regimes. The self-authorisation involved in advanced 
care planning can render the power to interfere non-arbitrary, as well as reducing undue 
legal discretion by making it transparent under what conditions power will be exercised. 
In addition, an increase in participatory roles for people with psychological disabilities 
in the drafting, review, and post-legislative administration of the law also serves to 
bolster an indirect and collective form of control over how the criteria for making 
decisions for others are formed and understood. It thereby reduces arbitrariness in their 
institution as well as discretion over their interpretation. 
  The self-authorisation and participatory strategies recommended here are not 
the only possible civic republican tools for combatting domination. Contemporary 
republicans have often turned to constitutional and judicial remedies to arbitrary power. 
This includes provision for judicial review, ombudsmen, and expert commissions with 
powers of redress when citizens face domination. What has been called ‘constitutional 
republicanism’ has sought an unelected apparatus of this kind to act as a check on an 
excessive and majoritarian popular power.55 Whatever the merits of this approach to 
political governance as a whole – I, for one, remain sceptical – this is not a set of 
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republican tools which should be recommended for addressing domination in the 
context of psychological disability and disorder.56 
Why reject constitutional republicanism as an approach to the reform of 
decisional regimes? In short: it involves acting for others rather than enabling them to 
act for themselves. 57  Of course, by their very nature, decisional regimes recognise 
some limits on the ability of people to act for themselves, insofar as deciding on behalf 
of others is permitted. However, it is not a promising solution to delegate the 
responsibility to regulate power over a marginalised and potentially vulnerable group 
to those with little democratic mandate, and who will likely be drawn from an existing 
juridico-political elite. In this respect, despite calls for “many institutional sites for 
challenge and contestation, discussion and decision-making”, constitutional 
republicans like Pettit place too much faith in the non-alien nature of undemocratic 
legal and quasi-legal institutions.58 This overreliance on top-down responses to 
arbitrary power is both too complacent about the domination that can arise from an 
insufficiently accountable elite, and fails to take the importance of self-rule seriously 
enough.59 
Self-rule is particularly important in the context of disability. However, 
constitutional republicans sometimes give the impression that they have little to add to 
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our understanding of positive forms of self-determination, both in relation to the 
depoliticised remedies to domination they recommend or more generally. For instance, 
Philip Pettit, the leading contemporary republican theorist, tells us, “people can be 
trusted to look after their own autonomy, given that they live under a dispensation 
where they are protected from domination by others”.60 However, in the context of 
illness and disability, this might seem naïve, since resilient protection from arbitrary 
power is compatible with a lack of those freedoms necessary for substantive self-
governance. For example, even in conditions of non-domination, someone with an 
acquired brain injury who lacks positive support from others may struggle both to think 
through whether they ought attempt to live on their own, and to actually arrange the 
process of moving house and entering into a tenancy agreement. For such a person, then 
the combination of resilient protection from arbitrary power and trust in their 
endogenous resources and abilities alone may not be sufficient to secure a sufficiently 
significant level of autonomy. 
In the more restricted context of depoliticised tools to combat domination – such 
as ombudsmen, commissions, and review boards where citizens can contest arbitrary 
power – outsourcing authority to unelected experts poses problems. Indirectly, it 
contributes to the political deskilling of those with psychological disabilities and 
disorders, since action is not taken by them but only for them, with a concomitant lack 
of opportunities to hone one’s abilities. Furthermore, radical republican traditions have 
stressed the importance of a “politics of solidarity, in which those who suffered from 
servitude were also expected to be the agents of emancipation”, since they possess the 
shared interests and insights to undertake the right kinds of political intervention.61 The 
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alternative places people in the position of supplicants rather than agents of their own 
emancipation, which reproduces rather than unsettles the unequal socio-political 
statuses that republicans are committed to opposing.  
While it may not always be possible for someone to meaningfully participate in 
shaping the authority held over them – and many people will have little inclination to 
do so even when they can – we should seek to maximise the routes through which self-
rule is at least possible. This does not completely exclude use of the tools mooted by 
constitutional republicans in some form. However, they ought not to be the main policy 
recommendations associated with a republican approach to decisional regimes, and 
should be severed from the anti-politicising ethos out of which they emerge. In contrast, 
popular republicanism, rather than a predominantly constitutional one, will favour 
participatory controls upon the power held over those with psychological disabilities 
and disorders. 
  
Conclusion 
 
In this article, I have identified and denaturalised a broadly liberal egalitarian 
conceptual framework which informs evaluations of decisional capacity law, and 
developed a civic republican approach which goes beyond it. I do not claim to have 
shown that this civic republican framework is unassailable. Nor do I suppose that liberal 
egalitarians - especially characterised with such a broad brush - can find no retort to the 
objections raised against them. My aim has instead been to take the first steps in 
offering an alternative way to understand the desiderata of mental capacity law reform. 
To those ends, civic republicanism provides resources for demonstrating how 
decisional law can generate forms of dominating unfreedom to which other accounts 
are insufficiently sensitive. It also foregrounds the value of non-domination and 
  
participatory self-rule, and indicates some of their implications for legal and sublegal 
governance of illness and disability. This results in initial proposals to reform rather 
than necessarily dispense with mechanisms that would permit decisions to be made for 
others that might conflict with their current will and preferences. 
The first such proposal is to adopt functional rather than diagnostic or hybrid 
tests of decisional capacity. This is supported on the republican grounds that the 
alternatives intensify relationships of domination over people diagnosed with 
psychological disabilities and threaten their equal civic status as free persons (rather 
than on the basis that it discriminates against them in relation to their negative liberty 
of action). The second proposal is to make greater use of the self-authorising structures 
of advanced care planning to reduce domination that can arise in negotiating the 
problem of legal capacity. I have argued that civic republicanism not only recommends 
such measures but can also give a more determinate theoretical account of the 
relationship between self-authorisation and freedom than the liberal egalitarian 
alternatives. The third main proposal calls for participatory input into the institution 
and administration of decisional capacity law, including greater procedural controls 
over who can assess and decide for oneself, more scope for contributions from 
advocacy groups in the construction of legislation and codes of practice, and more 
recognition of expertise-by-experience in review and oversight mechanisms.  
This civic republican analysis leaves the door open to more trenchant opposition 
to mental capacity law as well as to resurgent defences of it. In the absence of a more 
decisive case for the abolition of decisional regimes, it offered three desiderata for their 
reform, underpinned by philosophical argumentation building upon nascent republican 
engagement with medico-juridical power. These are not yet detailed policy 
prescriptions but rather indicate a promising direction of travel for the appraisal of 
  
medical and disability law. I have resisted endorsing a further set of depoliticising tools 
associated with constitutional republicanism, since the non-domination they promise to 
secure comes at too heavy a cost in terms of the agency of those with psychological 
disabilities. This discussion of legal capacity thereby brings home a wider moral for 
republicans themselves: civic freedom is hindered by the usurpation of our own activity 
and not only its domination.62 
 
                                                     
62 For further discussion of the relationship between domination and usurpation of agency, see P Markell 
‘The Insufficiency of Non-Domination’ (2008) 36 Political Theory p 9. 
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